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M
ore than 30 years ago, before passage of 
the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), 
relatively few banks made meaningful 
numbers of loans to people with low and 
moderate incomes. Whether because of racial discrimi-
nation or fear of credit weaknesses, many banks “red-
lined” entire areas of American cities as places where 
they would not lend.1 Accordingly, most inner cities 
were islands of urban blight whose residents had limited 
access to capital. The prospects were scant for breaking 
the cycle of urban decay, except through direct govern-
ment investment.
The overwhelming majority of studies find that the 
CRA has succeeded in increasing lending in low- and 
moderate-income neighborhoods. Inner cities have not 
yet been wholly transformed by the CRA, but they have 
been demonstrably improved by the act’s implementa-
tion. Most bankers would now agree that many low- and 
moderate-income individuals living in neighborhoods 
that were once redlined have proved they can respon-
sibly use credit to better their lives. Indeed, this basic 
lesson—that people who have been shut out of the bank-
ing system can be sound credit risks—has been proved 
true all over the world. Muhammad Yunus, who won the 
Nobel Prize for his work in microcredit lending, more 
recently demonstrated that such lending can provide 
access to the productive economy to even the poorest of 
the poor. 
Although the act has been the law for decades, the 
controversy surrounding it has never completely faded. 
Its supporters argue it has not fulfilled its potential, 
particularly in recent years, because regulators have 
failed to enforce it aggressively. From time to time, 
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bankers criticize the CRA as unnecessary, unfair, and 
burdensome, a criticism that was more prevalent before 
the 1994 regulatory revisions, particularly among 
small banks. Most recently, a handful of critics have 
argued, incorrectly, that the CRA led to the subprime 
crisis because it pressured banks to lend to people 
with insufficient income and against properties that 
lacked enough value to collateralize the loan. In fact, 
the subprime crisis resulted from high-rate interest 
loans—often originated by unregulated mortgage brokers 
who are not subject to the CRA or bank regulation—and 
fueled by excessive leverage, the antithesis of CRA 
lending. 
The banking industry has also seen fundamental 
changes since the CRA became law in 1977. For ex-
ample, market-based lenders such as money market 
funds and securities firms held more financial assets than 
banks in recent years. Most banks in the late 1970s were 
local businesses and typically did not operate statewide. 
Today, the banking industry is dominated by very large 
institutions–some with more than $2 trillion in assets–
with extensive interstate branching networks. Moreover, 
a substantial number of homebuyers had their mortgages 
originated from nonbank lenders, such as Countrywide 
Financial (now part of Bank of America). 
One consequence of these changes is that certain un-
derlying assumptions that Congress made when it passed 
the act no longer hold. For example, Congress assumed 
that banks would continue to be the most important 
financial enterprises in the economy and were therefore  
uniquely granted the support of the federal safety net. 
Banks are no longer unique, as the reach of the federal 
safety net has been extended to nonbank financial com-
1	 	Ironically,	even	the	federal	government	played	a	role	in	shutting	out	inner-city	neighborhoods	from	traditional	sources	of	credit	by	encourag-
ing the development of credit maps. See Amy E. Hillier, “Redlining and the Homeowner’s Loan Corporation.” Journal of Urban History, 29(4) 
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panies. In the late 1990s, the Federal Reserve arranged 
the bailout of a hedge fund, Long Term Capital Manage-
ment. Most recently, it arranged and participated in the 
bailout of insurance company American International 
Group, the nationalization of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, and the bailout of investment bank Bear Stearns, 
and it has granted broker-dealers access to the Federal 
Reserve’s Discount Window. An additional assumption, 
correct at the time, was that banks had clearly defined 
service areas, but interstate banking has made a geo-
graphically-based service area outdated.
If the CRA is to continue to be effective, it must be 
modernized by expanding its reach to nonbanks and 
its service area focus from one that is almost entirely 
local to one that can be national in appropriate 
circumstances.
This paper examines the history of the CRA; academ-
ic studies of its accomplishments; why the CRA is not to 
blame for the subprime mortgage crisis; and it offers rec-
ommendations to address lingering issues surrounding 
the CRA, particularly how it might be changed in light of 
the changed financial services landscape. 
The History of the CRA
Beginning in 1935, the Home Owners’ Loan Corpora-
tion (at the behest of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board) 
in collaboration with private organizations developed 
maps that rated areas in and around larger American cit-
ies for mortgage lending risk. The riskiest neighborhoods 
were outlined in red. Private lenders used these maps 
as guides to determine where they should lend, and as 
a consequence, lending decisions for homes in suppos-
edly high-risk areas were not based on the income of the 
individual, but on the neighborhood in which the person 
lived. Because it was common practice for homes in 
white neighborhoods to have covenants that prohibited 
ownership by racial and religious minorities, redlining 
meant that racial minorities and the poor were concen-
trated in the most rundown parts of cities, areas that were 
made worse by the race riots of the 1960s.
Much change was needed to turn blighted areas 
of American cities around, including an end to racial 
discrimination and improved government services. It was 
also clear by the mid-1970s that normal access to tradi-
tional credit channels for residents and small businesses 
in redlined neighborhoods was essential to rebuilding 
the inner city. 
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1977
Congress banned racial discrimination in lending 
in the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 and in the 
Fair Housing Act, which was passed as part of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1968. Despite these measures, Congress 
needed to outlaw redlining as well because lenders were 
engaging in “neighborhood discrimination” by denying 
mortgages to applicants on the basis of the neighbor-
hood in which the property was located, not on the 
creditworthiness of an individual borrower.2  Even a mid-
dle-income borrower might be denied a loan for a house 
in a redlined neighborhood. Senator William Proxmire, 
a Wisconsin Democrat who was then the chairman of 
the Senate Banking Committee and who engineered the 
CRA’s passage, remarked that “many creditworthy areas 
[were] denied loans,” a trend he argued “undoubtedly 
aggravates urban decline.”3  
The CRA was included in the Housing and Com-
munity Development Act of 1977 and was signed into 
law by President Jimmy Carter on October 12, 1977. 
In his remarks, the president made specific note of the 
CRA, congratulating Congress on “devising the formulae 
to channel funds into areas that are most in need” by 
“add[ing] a restraint on unwarranted redlining of de-
pressed areas.”4  Since its passage, the scope of the CRA 
has expanded from urban inner cities to include disad-
vantaged rural communities as well. 
But why would banks choose to ignore profitable 
lending opportunities?  One answer is a market failure, 
in this case information barriers and costs. When the 
CRA became law, 14,411 commercial banks and 
4,388 thrifts were operating, but relatively few had 
branches in redlined neighborhoods.5 Because banks 
2   15 U.S.C. §§1691 et seq. and 42 U.S.C §§ 3601 et seq.
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were not located there, they lacked awareness of 
attractive lending opportunities in those neighborhoods.  
Banks feel safer and find it more convenient to lend 
in a familiar neighborhood than an unfamiliar one, as 
investigating a new neighborhood requires spending 
time and effort. 
Likewise, low- and moderate-income borrowers typi-
cally lacked sufficient knowledge of finance; thus, unlike 
more active participants in the financial system, they 
may not have known how best to approach banks. Lang 
and Nakamura and Ling and Wachter confirmed that 
banks face an initial informational barrier to overcome.6  
However, if one bank found successful lending oppor-
tunities in an area, others soon followed. Some banks 
might “free ride” on the efforts of others and cherry-pick 
the easiest lending opportunities. 
Another critical problem was racial discrimination. 
Munnell and colleagues, reviewing Boston-area HMDA 
data, concluded that minority loan applicants had a 
higher loan denial rate, even when controlling for eco-
nomic, employment, and neighborhood characteristics.7 
Avery et al found that lower levels of lending to blacks 
could not be fully explained by income and wealth.8
Of course, banks did not entirely ignore inner cities. 
The Senate Banking Committee found that some finan-
cial institutions were simply taking deposits from inner 
city residents and lending them elsewhere. Senator Prox-
mire cited several examples of disinvestment, including 
the situation in Brooklyn, New York, where only about 
11 percent of local deposits were reinvested in the com-
munity, and a similar case in Washington, DC, where a 
bank invested “about 90 percent of the money…outside 
of the community where the money [was] deposited.”9 
Senator Robert B. Morgan, a Democrat from North 
Carolina, led the opposition to the CRA. Although Mor-
gan said he supported the “ultimate intent” of the CRA, 
which was “to assure that the credit needs of the inner 
city are adequately met,” he argued that if it were effec-
tive, the CRA would amount to credit allocation, but if 
it failed, it would only discourage inner-city lending.10  
In response to concerns regarding credit allocation, the 
lending quotas mandated by early drafts of the act were 
removed. Thus, the enacted version of the CRA does not 
state the amount or the manner by which financial in-
stitutions should fulfill their community obligations, leav-
ing considerable flexibility for the institutions and their 
regulators to determine the details of CRA compliance 
programs. Anticipating critics’ charge that the CRA forces 
institutions to make bad loans, the act explicitly provides 
that CRA lending should be “consistent with the safe and 
sound operation of such institution.”11  
The CRA applies only to banks and thrifts.12 Con-
gress reasoned that these institutions already have a 
“continuing and affirmative obligation to help meet the 
credit needs of the local communities in which they 
are chartered.”13 Additional legislation was necessary 
because “the absence of specific, statutory language…
undercut efforts to get a uniform policy of community 
reinvestment.”14  Senator Proxmire added that, “conve-
nience and needs does not just mean drive-in teller win-
dows and Christmas Club accounts. It means loans.”15  
At the time, banks and thrifts were the dominant lenders 
and were thought to have “the capital, the know-how, 
and the efficiency to do the job” of making loans to 
rebuild cities.16  To encourage compliance with the act, 
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10	 	Ibid.,	H8653.
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12	 	Ibid.
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institutions’ adequacy in meeting “the convenience and 
needs” of their local communities, defined as including 
both deposit and credit services.17  
Another important reason that banks and thrifts were 
deemed to have an obligation to lend in their neigh-
borhoods was that the government’s grant of a charter 
confers special privileges, such as protection from 
competition and access to the federal safety net, includ-
ing low-cost deposit insurance from the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and inexpensive credit 
from the Federal Reserve Banks and the Federal Home 
Loan Banks.18 
Legislative Amendments to the CRA
Since its passage in 1977, Congress has amended  
the CRA several times. The first revisions took place as 
part of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), which required regu-
latory agencies to make public their CRA evaluations 
and ratings.19  
Two years later, Congress passed the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, 
which expanded the regulators’ information disclosure 
requirements to include publication of both the data and 
the factual findings used to support the rating assigned 
to an institution. In making these changes, Congress 
sought to promote greater uniformity and transparency in 
CRA examinations and ratings, in response to activists’ 
complaints that it was nearly impossible to determine 
regulators’ assessment criteria or to monitor an institu-
tion’s CRA performance.20  
Following the FIRREA amendments to the CRA, 
regulators adopted a more descriptive four-level ratings 
scale: Outstanding, Satisfactory, Needs to Improve, and 
Substantial Noncompliance.21  Ironically, this new rating 
scheme in the view of some community activists com-
pressed ratings and made it more difficult to differentiate 
between mediocre, good, and excellent ratings.22  How-
ever, following the rule change, a larger proportion of 
institutions received below-average ratings than before, 
indicating that regulators were becoming more rigorous 
in their examinations.23  
Of course, the reason the CRA’s supporters and Con-
gress wanted a more rigorous rating process was their 
belief that banks would want to avoid receiving a poor 
CRA rating and risk having an application to establish a 
new branch or to buy a bank rejected on the basis of a 
low rating. Furthermore, a low rating might make a bank 
less attractive to potential buyers. As it turned out, the 
CRA ratings did decline, but application denials linked 
to the CRA did not significantly increase. Thomas found 
that regulators denied only 20 more applications by 
1996, bringing the total number of denials since the act’s 
passage to 31 of nearly 105,000 applications.24 
The Resolution Trust Corporation Refinancing, 
Restructuring, and Improvement Act of 1991 and the 
Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 
(1992 HCDA) contained subtle changes to increase 
the range of activities eligible for CRA credit. The 
former stipulated that banks could get CRA credit for 
participating in lending consortia with minority- or 
women-owned banks or low-income credit unions, 
provided that the loans benefited the local community. 
The 1992 HCDA stated that providing a branch in 
predominately minority areas, or to minority- or women-
owned banks, should be viewed positively during CRA 
evaluations. Lawmakers reasoned that minority- and 
women-owned institutions are more likely to provide 
17   123 Cong. Rec. H8932 (daily ed. Jun. 6, 1977).
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credit to low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, 
and assisting those institutions would indirectly promote 
CRA-related lending.25
The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act of 1994 made more significant changes. 
Up to this point, it was unclear that a bank had much at 
stake in CRA assessments. Congress amended the CRA 
to require that regulators conduct separate CRA perfor-
mance assessments for each state in which an institution 
maintains a presence, with the intention of discouraging 
banks from taking the deposits they raised in one state 
and using them to ratchet up lending in another.26  In 
addition, given that banks needed a Satisfactory rating 
for regulatory approval of interstate branches, Riegle-
Neal augmented community activists’ leverage to extract 
CRA lending commitments. The effect of these changes 
was that banks planning to branch out across states, 
which were generally larger institutions, were motivated 
to achieve high CRA ratings. Today, however, most 
banks have long since branched out, diminishing the 
importance of the additional incentive that Riegle-Neal 
provided.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA) in-
cluded several revisions to the CRA legislation. First, it 
required that a banking firm and all of its subsidiaries re-
ceive and maintain CRA ratings of Satisfactory or higher 
to establish a financial holding company and engage in 
expanded financial activities. Likewise, national banks 
must receive and maintain at least a Satisfactory rating 
to establish and maintain a financial subsidiary, which a 
bank must do if it wants to conduct securities business. 
Second, the GLBA mandated that terms be disclosed of 
CRA-related agreements that were negotiated between 
financial institutions and community groups. This provi-
sion reflected the view of Senator Phil Gramm, a Texas 
Republican, that community activists “extort” commit-
ments from banks with threats of protests and challenges. 
The third revision was in response to industry complaints 
about the burden of compliance. The GLBA limits the 
frequency with which regulators can conduct CRA 
examinations at institutions with ratings of Satisfactory or 
higher. It also prohibits agencies from performing CRA 
examinations at institutions with less than $250 million 
in assets or that are affiliated with a holding company 
with less than $1 billion in assets.27  
The GLBA significantly reduced the number of CRA 
examinations, given that many banks are categorized as 
Small. Apgar and Duda found that less than 30 percent 
of all residential mortgage loans were subject to CRA 
review in 2003.28 
The 1995 Regulatory Reform
Regulators in 1995, at the behest of President Clinton, 
also substantially changed how the CRA is administered. 
Prior to 1995, CRA examiners assessed performance on 
the basis of 12 factors and then rated institutions on a 
five-point scale, where 1 was the highest possible grade 
and 5 the lowest. These ratings were opaque and sub-
jective. For instance, the Federal Home Loan Bank, the 
former thrift regulator, considered a ranking of 3 to be 
Satisfactory while the three other federal bank regulators 
required a rating of 2 for a bank’s CRA performance to 
be considered adequate.29  
Not many institutions received low CRA ratings, and 
those that did seemed to suffer few consequences. It was 
extremely rare for a regulator to deny an application for 
a branch or a merger on the basis of an institution’s CRA 
rating. A study by Thomas found only 11 CRA denials 
out of more than 50,000 branch and merger applications 
between 1977 and 1989.30 
Both regulated financial institutions and CRA support-
ers complained that enforcement was too subjective and 
bureaucratic and that the examinations focused too much 
on process, primarily evaluating institutions on the basis 
of their plans for low- and moderate-income lending rath-
er than actual lending performance.31  Statistics on early 
CRA enforcement actions and ratings are unavailable, 
given that the regulators did not publish that information 
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prior to the 1989 passage of FIRREA.32 
In response to these criticisms, President Clinton asked 
the regulatory agencies in July 1993 to reform how they 
implemented the CRA to provide more standardized and 
objective assessments that emphasized lending perfor-
mance and to make sanctions against noncompliant insti-
tutions more effective.33  The President’s goals were to: 
•  Promote consistency and evenhandedness in CRA 
enforcement,
•  Improve public CRA performance evaluations,
•  Implement more effective sanctions, and
•  Develop more objective, performance-based CRA 
assessment standards.34
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
headed the interagency review effort, which was the first 
comprehensive assessment since the act had passed 16 
years earlier. In 1994, the agencies held multiple hear-
ings in cities from coast to coast to gauge public reaction 
to the CRA, its effectiveness and its burden, and to solicit 
suggestions for its improvement. Individuals and orga-
nizations submitted thousands of pages of comments, 
and the heads of the relevant agencies were personally 
involved in creating the proposed and final rules. In 
April 1995, the agencies released the final, revised inter-
agency regulations. The regulations changed the system 
of assessment from one that was heavily subjective and 
paper-based, to one that was more objective and de-
emphasized form over substance compliance. 
The revised regulations also tailored the examination 
approach such that evaluations took into account the 
institution’s size and business strategy.35  The following 
four examination models are still used today. The first 
model is a basic assessment for small retail institutions, 
which measures four lending ratios. A second type of 
examination is applied to large retail businesses, which 
consists of rigorous tests to evaluate lending, investment, 
and service. The third model is given to wholesale or 
limited-purpose community institutions. Those institu-
tions are permitted to select the criterion under which 
they are to be evaluated: community development (CD) 
lending, CD investments, and/or CD services. The fourth 
model is the “strategic plan” examination, available to 
firms of any size, where an institution determines its own 
lending, investment, or service performance standards.36  
Under all models, each institution is evaluated within 
its Performance Context, which reflects the institution’s 
characteristics, including its products and business 
model, its peers, its competitors, its market, and the eco-
nomic and demographic features of its assessment areas. 
Retail institutions are evaluated on their performance 
within their assessment areas, but wholesale institutions 
can be assessed on the basis of their efforts nationwide.37  
The impact of the changed regulations was sub-
stantial. Paperwork burdens declined, CRA loan com-
mitments by banks substantially increased, and CRA 
grading by the regulatory agencies became tougher.  Al-
though the revised regulations have continued to lessen 
paperwork burdens, and loan commitments remain 
strong, grading has become less onerous. As of June 
2008, 79.7 percent of examinations resulted in a Satis-
factory rating, 16.1 percent in an Outstanding rating, and 
4.1 percent in a rating of either Needs to Improve or a 
Substantial Noncompliance.38  The share of Outstanding 
ratings stood at 27 percent prior to the 1995 reforms, but 
fell to approximately ten percent though 2001. The share 
of below-Satisfactory ratings continued to hover around 
two to three percent even after the reforms. The latest CRA 
ratings data indicate that the ratings’ distribution is return-
ing to what it was after the passage of the FIRREA in 1989, 
when roughly 80 percent of all institutions were rated as 
Satisfactory and the remaining institutions were divided 
between Outstanding and below-Satisfactory ratings.39 A 
case can be made that the strong CRA ratings reflect an 
improvement in CRA activities, at least at some banks.
32   GAO, “Community Reinvestment Act.”
33	 	Board	of	Governors,	“Performance	and	Profitability”	and	Apgar	and	Duda,	“The	Twenty-Fifth	Anniversary	of	the	Community	Reinvestment	Act.
34   Thomas, “CRA’s 25th Anniversary.”
35	 	Board	of	Governors,	“Performance	and	Profitability.”
36   Thomas, “CRA’s 25th Anniversary.”
37	 	Board	of	Governors,	“Performance	and	Profitability.”
38	 	FFIEC.	CRA	Rating	Database.	(Washington,	DC:	FFIEC,	August	2008),	available	at	www.ffiec.gov/craratings/default.aspx.
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Empirical Evidence Regarding the  
Impact of the CRA
What has the CRA accomplished during the 30 years 
since its passage?  Several studies examine this question 
and point to areas for future improvements. To make 
sense of these studies, it is necessary to identify the 
version of the rules the authors are assessing given that 
the act and its implementation rules have been changed 
significantly over the years.  The following discussion 
covers the initial approach to implementing the CRA 
as well as major changes that increased disclosure and 
stressed performance over process.  
With regard to the initial version of the act, most ob-
servers find that, despite the vast majority of institutions 
receiving at least a Satisfactory rating, the act effected 
only a modest increase in lending, and documenting 
CRA performance created an excessive paperwork bur-
den on banks. The changes to the act in the early to mid-
1990s made the ratings more transparent and increased 
the incentives for larger banks to achieve at least a 
Satisfactory rating. Finally, most observers agree that the 
1995 interagency revisions to the CRA regulations had 
the biggest impact on CRA lending and led to increased 
lending and reduced regulatory burden.
Specifically, the evidence shows that the changes 
made to the law and regulations in the 1990s coincided 
with a rise from $1.6 billion in 1990 annual commit-
ments to $103 billion in 1999, and peaking at $812 
billion in 1998.40  CRA lending volume increased greatly 
between 1993 and 2000.41 The number of CRA-eligible 
home purchase loans originated by CRA lenders and 
their affiliates rose from 462,000 to 1.3 million.42  
The Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard 
University conducted one of the most comprehensive 
studies of the CRA’s effectiveness. Using enriched HMDA 
data to evaluate the CRA’s performance between 1993 
and 2000, researchers found that the CRA-regulated 
financial institutions operating in their assessment areas 
outstripped noncovered or out-of-area lenders in origi-
nating conventional, conforming, prime mortgages to 
CRA-eligible borrowers. Their multivariate statistical 
analysis confirms that CRA lenders originated more 
home purchase loans to lower-income individuals and 
in low- and moderate-income  communities, and the 
lenders acquired a greater proportion of the low- and 
moderate-income loan market than they would have 
without the influence of the CRA. The researchers found 
further that the CRA “may have increased the CRA-
eligible loan origination share by seven percent, from 
30.3 percent to 32.4 percent” during the study period.43 
This seven percent increase translated to 42,000 origina-
tions. They also find evidence of more rapid increases in 
housing prices and higher turnover rates in CRA-eligible 
neighborhoods, indicating higher levels of demand from 
the wider availability of funds to borrowers in these 
areas. Finally, from interviews with CRA lenders, the 
researchers report that lenders incorporated CRA lend-
ing into standard business practices, which they found 
“profitable, productive of good will, or both.”44 
Other studies find that the CRA has been effective 
in encouraging financial institutions to lend to redlined 
neighborhoods. Several analyses conclude that the 
CRA had a positive influence in encouraging lending to 
low- and moderate-income borrowers and in low- and 
moderate-income neighborhoods. Litan and colleagues 
estimate that the CRA accounted for up to 20 percent 
of the growth in low- and moderate-income lending 
among CRA lenders, and that CRA lenders were more 
likely to originate prime loans to low- and moderate-
income borrowers than were non-CRA lenders.45  Avery 
and colleagues and Apgar and Duda both conclude that 
the CRA has expanded lending and service to low- and 
moderate-income individuals and neighborhoods. Avery 
40   National Community Reinvestment Coalition, “CRA Commitments” (Washington, DC: NCRC, September, 2007). 
41   Factors other than the CRA reforms per se may also have contributed to this increase, including a strong economy, low interest rates, the 
development of credit scoring models (which reduced processing costs), and the increased use of securitization and the maturing of the second-
ary market, which enabled depository institutions to increase their mortgage lending volumes beyond their core deposit base and allowed 
nondepository	mortgage	financing	companies	to	expand	their	lending	activities.
42   Robert E. Litan et al. “The Community Reinvestment Act after Financial Modernization: A Final Report” (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Treasury, January, 2001); Joint Center for Housing Studies, “The 25th Anniversary of the Community Reinvestment Act: Access to Capital in 
an Evolving Financial Services System” (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, March, 2002).
43   Joint Center for Housing Studies, “The 25th Anniversary of the Community Reinvestment Act,” p. 58.
44   Joint Center for Housing Studies, “The 25th Anniversary of the Community Reinvestment Act.” 
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finds this was particularly true for consolidating organi-
zations, and Apgar and Duda find that CRA lenders op-
erating within their assessment areas made a larger share 
of prime, conventional loans to CRA-eligible borrowers 
than either CRA lenders operating outside their assess-
ment areas or non-CRA lenders.46 
In addition, studies find that lending to low- and 
moderate-income and minority borrowers increased at 
a faster pace than lending to higher-income borrowers. 
Avery and colleagues, for example, find that lending to 
low-income borrowers increased by about 31 percent 
between 1993 and 1997, while lending to higher-in-
come borrowers increased by only 18 percent over the 
same period.47  Likewise, the number of home purchase 
loans made to residents of low-income neighborhoods 
increased 43 percent while lending to high-income 
neighborhoods rose only 17 percent.48  Moreover, Barr 
finds that homeownership in low- and moderate-income 
areas increased by 26 percent between 1990 and 2000, 
whereas it increased only 14 percent in high-income 
areas during the same period.49  
However, the research also indicates that the CRA 
may not be keeping up with innovations and trends in 
the financial industry, such as industry consolidation 
and nondepository lending, and this is eroding the act’s 
effectiveness. Apgar and Duda find that the 25 largest 
lenders originated 52 percent of all home purchase loans 
in 2000; each of these lenders made more than 25,000 
loans. However, in 1993, only 14 institutions made more 
than 25,000 loans, making up 23.5 percent of the retail 
mortgage market.50  Similarly, Avery and colleagues note 
a 40 percent drop in the number of commercial banks 
and savings associations between 1975 and 1997 due 
to mergers and acquisitions, liquidations, and failures. 
Concomitant to the consolidation trend, more of the 
remaining financial institutions are operating outside 
their assessment areas, lending through affiliated mort-
gage and finance companies. Mergers and acquisitions 
extended the geographic reach of many institutions such 
that by 1998, firms with out-of-state headquarters owned 
more than 25 percent of banking assets.51  
Other observations suggest that industry consolida-
tion itself may have had little direct effect on CRA lend-
ing by banks and thrifts. For example, Avery and col-
leagues find no consistent, robust relationship between 
consolidation and home purchase lending between 1993 
and 1997 at the market level. They find instead that the 
percentage change in lending in areas with high consoli-
dation differed little from that in low-consolidation ar-
eas. However, the authors note that institutions increased 
their lending by only eight percent in their assessment 
areas, but 69 percent elsewhere, so any regional lending 
changes attributable to consolidation could have been 
offset by lending activities at other institutions.52  Further-
more, CRA-regulated institutions operating within their 
assessment areas originated only 38 percent of all con-
ventional prime residential mortgages and three percent 
of subprime loans in 2000.53  
It does seem clear, however, that industry consolida-
tion was accompanied by nondepository lenders gaining 
larger shares of mortgage origination in the years prior 
to the current market turmoil. Given that nondepository 
lenders are exempt from CRA requirements, their in-
creasing share of mortgage originations may have weak-
ened the act’s scope and its ability to encourage stable 
lending in low- and moderate-income areas. In 1993, 
thrifts originated nearly 50 percent of mortgages on one- 
to four-unit properties, and commercial banks originate 
another 22 percent. Four years later, mortgage companies 
such as brokers and retail mortgage banks originated 56 
percent of these loans. They grew by taking market share 
from thrifts, which were responsible for only 18 percent 
of such loans.54  In addition, the mortgage industry’s 
increasing specialization in delivery channels caused 
46   Robert B. Avery et al., “Trends in Home Purchase Lending: Consolidation and the Community Reinvestment Act.” Federal Reserve Bulletin 
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mortgage lending to move out from banks. Commer-
cial banks made one-fourth of all originations in 1997, 
although their mortgage company affiliates or subsidiar-
ies processed as many as 43 percent of the residential 
mortgages the commercial banks originated.55  
Scholars also studied the profitability of CRA lending, 
as the statute requires CRA lending to be safe and sound. 
Studies generally concur that CRA loans are profitable, 
although often less so than standard loans. Meeker and 
Myers carried out a national survey of banks, savings 
and loans institutions, and bank holding companies with 
mortgage subsidiaries. Almost all said CRA lending was 
profitable, although a significant proportion noted that 
it was less so than other types of loans. However, the 
response rate to the survey was only 16 percent and the 
sample of responses was not randomly selected.56 
In a more recent survey, the Federal Reserve Board 
of Governors contacted the largest CRA-covered retail 
lending institutions. Eighty-two percent of respondents 
reported that CRA home purchase and refinancing loans 
were profitable, and 56 percent reported that CRA loans 
were generally as profitable as other home purchas-
ing and refinancing loans. However, 51 percent of the 
surveyed institutions stated that CRA loans had a higher 
delinquency rate relative to all loans, although 69 per-
cent indicated that charge-offs for CRA loans were either 
no different from, or were lower than, the rate for other 
loans. These results may be skewed by nonresponse bias, 
given that only 29 percent, or 143 of the original sample 
of 500 institutions, responded. Moreover the findings 
may not apply to smaller institutions, given that the 
responding banks accounted for 40 to 55 percent of all 
CRA-loan originations at the time.57  
Naturally, the CRA is not without its critics. The 
most often cited is Jeffery Gunther, who argues that the 
benefits of the act do not outweigh its costs. Gunther 
attributes the growth in low- and moderate-income 
lending between 1993 and 1997 to: (1) the removal or 
loosening of unnecessary regulations, such as interest 
rate and geographic restrictions; (2) a reduction in infor-
mation costs stemming from automation and improved 
communications technologies; and (3) the development 
of better relationships between real estate developers 
and neighborhood associations. He finds that low- and 
moderate-income lending at non-CRA institutions, such 
as credit unions and independent mortgage companies, 
grew faster than at CRA-covered institutions. Gunther 
claims the low- and moderate-income share of the 
lending portfolios at non-CRA firms increased from 11 
percent in 1993 to 14.3 percent in 1997, whereas that 
of CRA lenders remained at approximately 11.5 percent 
over the same period. He also adds that non-CRA lend-
ers accounted for slightly less than 40 percent of all one- 
to four-family home purchase loans originated in low- 
and moderate-income neighborhoods in 1997. These 
facts lead Gunther to conclude that because non-CRA 
lenders tend to be subject to fewer regulatory restrictions 
than their CRA counterparts, the loosening of regulations 
must be the major reason for the increase in volume of 
low- and moderate-income lending.58 
Gunther also argues that the CRA imposes costs by 
encouraging institutions to take on additional credit risk. 
He finds that higher CRA lending levels are positively 
correlated with a problematic CAMELS rating, defined 
as a 3 or higher, but negatively correlated with a prob-
lematic CRA rating. He also finds a positive correlation 
between low- and moderate-income lending volume and 
a problematic CAMELS rating, but he finds no statistical 
relationship between low- and moderate-income volume 
and problematic CRA ratings. Finally, Gunther finds a 
positive relationship between reduced profitability and 
problematic CAMELS and CRA ratings.59
Gunther’s evidence, however, is not persuasive. 
Although it is true that non-CRA lenders increased their 
share of subprime/CRA lending to 40 percent, they 
increased their share of all one- to four-family mortgage 
originations to an even higher 56 percent; they therefore 
did not increase their community lending by as much as 
their overall mortgage lending.60  Gunther also has not 
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tend to be on fair and reasonable commercial terms, and 
predatory loans, which are more likely to be made by 
companies that fall outside the jurisdiction of the CRA. 
In 2000, CRA-regulated institutions operating within 
their assessment areas originated only three percent of 
subprime loans.61  Further, Gunther fails to prove that in-
creased CRA lending caused the lower CAMELS ratings. 
An institution’s CAMELS rating can decline for many 
reasons unrelated to the CRA. For example, CRA lending 
is a small part of the business of insured depositories. 
As noted above, the institutions themselves report that 
charge-off rates for CRA loans are approximately equal 
to or lower than all other loans, although the delin-
quency may be higher. Perhaps the biggest weaknesses 
with Gunther’s claims are that his findings are based on 
small institutions and his data are old. The ratings data 
are from 1991 through 1996, and therefore do not reflect 
the impact of the 1995 rule revisions, which emphasize 
lending performance over process. Further, it is ques-
tionable whether results for small institutions can be 
extrapolated to large ones because small banks have less 
incentive to establish a robust CRA program. 
The CRA and the Subprime Loan Crisis
The most recent charge against the CRA is that it is to 
blame for the subprime lending crisis. In recent months, 
a few commentators, such as economist Larry Kudlow 
and Wall Street Journal editorial board member Stephen 
Moore, have argued that the crisis is an inevitable conse-
quence of the CRA.62  They charge that the act compels 
banks to lower their underwriting standards in order to 
make loans to people who live in low- and moderate-
income neighborhoods. Some critics add that the Riegle-
Neal Act and the GLBA ratcheted up the pressure on 
banks to lend to less creditworthy borrowers. They say 
that banks had little choice but to make “CRA loans,” 
which they assume to be less safe.
So how well do these arguments hold up to the 
empirical evidence?  Not well. Below, we examine the 
two fundamental arguments: (1) that the CRA caused the 
dramatic rise in subprime mortgage lending; and (2) that 
subprime mortgage default, per se, is the root cause of 
the present mortgage market crisis. 
History of Subprime Mortgages
Before we argue the point, we must define what 
we mean by a subprime mortgage. The term is used 
inconsistently in the relevant research. Under its 2001 
“Interagency Guidance,” the bank regulator community 
uses a definition of a subprime borrower, for example, as 
someone who has:
•  Two or more 30-day delinquencies in the last 12 
months, or one or more 60-day delinquencies in 
the last 24 months;
•  Judgment, foreclosure, repossession, or charge-off 
in the prior 24 months;
•  Bankruptcy in the last five years;
•  Relatively high default probability as evidenced 
by, for example, a credit bureau risk score (FICO) 
of 660 or below (depending on the product/collat-
eral), or other bureau of proprietary scores with an 
equivalent default probability likelihood; and/or
•  Debt service-to-income ratio of 50 percent or 
greater, or otherwise limited ability to cover family 
living expenses after deducting total monthly debt-
services requirements from monthly income.63
Lenders usually and more casually classify mortgages 
as subprime if the borrower has a FICO score of less 
than 620. However, loans with very high loan-to-value 
ratios may also be rated below prime.64  For example, 
some lenders consider a loan subprime if the borrower 
makes a down payment of five percent or less, even if 
their FICO score exceeds 660. 
Subprime loans are by no means synonymous with 
CRA loans. The differences are marked between the char-
acteristics of the borrowers who receive subprime loans 
and CRA loans. For example, an analysis of the HMDA 
data by ComplianceTech finds that, in 2006, about 
67 percent of subprime loans were made to upper- or 
61	 	Ibid.
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middle-income borrowers; low- and moderate-income 
borrowers received only about 28 percent.65  Indeed, 
low- and moderate-income  borrowers received the 
smallest share of subprime mortgage loans in each year 
between 2004 and 2007. Some might assume that the 
majority of subprime loans were offered to minorities. 
However, since 2004 (when more detailed HMDA data 
were collected), more than one-half of the subprime 
loans were issued to upper- and middle-income borrow-
ers in neighborhoods that were neither low nor moder-
ate income.66
Subprime mortgages present a wide range of default 
probability. Fair Isaac ranks an individual with a FICO 
score of 660 at the 42nd percentile of the borrower pop-
ulation; this person has a 15 percent chance of a delin-
quency that exceeds 90 days within 24 months. A person 
with a FICO score of 600 is ranked in the 31st percen-
tile, with a 31 percent chance of having a delinquency 
that is more than 90 days during the next 24 months.67  
Both these borrowers could be rated subprime.
Perhaps the best current characterization of a sub-
prime borrower is having a FICO score of less than 660, 
with one or more of the banking agency characteristics 
outlined above, and with nonstandard terms designed to 
maximize profitability to the lender, not to advance the 
goals of the CRA.
Subprime loans hardly existed before the early 1980s 
because, prior to that time, it was not legal for a bank 
to charge different interest rates depending on the risk, 
to make a variable interest rate loan, or to make a loan 
with balloon payments.68  Furthermore, as noted above, 
a combination of redlining and lending discrimination 
further discouraged loans to low- and moderate-income 
Americans.
Beginning in the early 1980s, banks were given the 
ability to price loans on the basis of risk, but it took 
more than a decade before subprime loans became 
common. As recently as 1995, only about ten percent 
of mortgage originations were subprime; by 1997 that 
number had grown to 14.5 percent.69 The Asian debt 
crisis in 1998 caused interest rates to rise and markets to 
suddenly become illiquid. One result was that holders 
of subprime mortgages discovered they had underpriced 
risk when default rates rose to levels higher than 
expected. The repricing of risk caused the number of 
subprime originations to decline. However, the business 
quickly recovered and, by 2002, the volume of subprime 
mortgages was growing faster than ever. Inside Mortgage 
Finance finds that subprime originations grew 56 percent 
between 2002 and 2003. 70  
There are important key differences between the 
subprime loans made after 2002 and those made during 
the 1990s, when all grades of subprime loans grew at 
approximately the same rate. According to Chomsisen-
gphet and Pennington-Cross, the growth in subprime 
loans between 2000 and 2003 was almost entirely in 
A-rated loans, the highest grade of subprime mortgages. 
In fact, the originations of lower grade subprime loans 
continued to decline slightly.71    
The Influence of the CRA on Subprime Originations
In Subprime Mortgages, the late Federal Reserve 
Governor Edward Gramlich argues that both market and 
regulatory developments help explain the rapid growth 
in subprime loans. The emergence of credit scoring, he 
notes, offered a more inclusive and less costly way to 
make loans. However, a more crucial factor, he finds, 
was investors’ expanding appetite for Wall Street’s sub-
prime securitizations. The share of subprime loans sold 
into securitizations grew from 28.4 percent in 1995, to 
55.1 percent in 1998, to more than 80 percent in 2006.72  
On the regulatory side, Gramlich believes the CRA 
played some role in the increase in subprime lending, 
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formerly redlined neighborhoods.73  For example, he 
points to a study by Immergluck and Wiles, which finds 
that more than one-half of subprime refinances were in 
predominately African-American census tracts. Gramlich 
sees this as an indication that some banks were targeting 
low- and moderate-income neighborhoods in order to 
demonstrate they were serving the community. 
However, over time, distinctions between CRA loans 
and subprime loans began to emerge. These distinctions 
are reflected both in regulatory attitudes and in more 
subjective observations. In the late 1990s and early 
2000s, regulators began to draw a material distinction 
between the modern subprime loan and a true CRA 
loan. In the early 1990s, many CRA loans were “sub-
prime” in the strictest sense of the term, meaning that 
borrowers in low- and moderate-income areas tended to 
have lower FICO scores. By the early 2000s, however, 
it was becoming clear that regulators were using the 
term “subprime” differently from “CRA loan,” and that 
CRA lending practices differed from those of non-CRA 
lenders in low- and moderate-income areas. The CRA 
lender tends to have a social, or at least a nonpredatory, 
objective, given that it is regulated and examined by the 
bank regulatory agencies. In contrast, subprime lend-
ing, particularly of the 2005 to 2007 vintage, partially 
perverted the goal of the CRA in that it became a kind of 
redlining in reverse. The nonbank, non-CRA lenders—
that is, modern subprime lenders—are driven to sell as 
many high rate loans as they can, with no particular 
social motivation. 
A study by the law firm Traiger and Hinckley finds 
evidence of this distinction between lenders in the 2006 
HMDA data. They conclude that banking companies that 
made CRA loans in the 15 most populous metropolitan 
statistical areas (MSAs) were more conservative in their 
lending practices than lenders not covered by the CRA. 
They find that 59 percent of these banks were less likely 
to originate high-cost loans, and when they did, the aver-
age interest rate was 51 basis points lower than the rate 
for prime loans. Interestingly, the banks that made CRA 
loans in large MSAs were 30 percent more likely to hold 
the high-cost CRA loans in portfolio than were banks 
and nonbanks that lent elsewhere. This suggests that the 
CRA has encouraged banks that lend in populous MSAs 
to take a thoughtful approach to low- and moderate-
income lending, instead of simply moving farther out on 
the risk curve.74  
Some analysts also point to the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 as playing a role in the rise of subprime lending 
because taxpayers could deduct interest on home, but 
not consumer, loans. This incentive is particularly strong 
when housing prices are rising and interest rates are low, 
as was the case in the early 2000s. For example, 2003 
loan performance data show that more than one-half of 
subprime loans were for cash-out refinancing. Gramlich 
discounts the importance of the home interest deduction 
in encouraging low- and moderate-income individuals 
to take out subprime loans because few of them itemize 
their returns, as is required to deduct mortgage interest.75  
Since 2000, the subprime mortgage market has 
evolved in such a way as to further discount the CRA 
as a significant factor in the subprime mortgage mar-
ket. Gramlich calculated from HMDA data that, “Only 
one-third of CRA mortgage loans to low- and moderate-
income borrowers have rates high enough to be consid-
ered subprime.”76  Moreover, the 2006 HMDA data show 
that middle- and upper-income census tracts were home 
to more than one-half of subprime loans compared with 
about 25 percent in low- and moderate-income tracts.77  
Another indication the subprime crisis was caused by 
factors other than the CRA is that un- or under-regulated 
mortgage brokers played an increasing role in originating 
subprime mortgages. Most of these brokerages are not 
owned by depository institutions or their affiliates, and 
are therefore not subject to the CRA. In 2004 and 2005, 
mortgage brokerage companies reported on more than 
60 percent of all loans and applications under HMDA. 
Two-thirds of the brokers were independent. According 
to the Federal Reserve, these independent brokers origi-
nate 50 percent of all subprime loans.78  If the CRA were 
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a driving consideration for depositories, banks and thrifts 
would want to be the portals through which all low- and 
moderate-income  borrowers enter to ensure they receive 
full CRA credit for originating all qualifying loans. 
As a case in point, Jim Rokakis, Treasurer of Cuya-
hoga County in Ohio, noted that in 2005, when home 
mortgage originations peaked in the Cleveland area, 
unregulated mortgage brokers made the vast majority of 
those loans. In 2005, he said, the biggest lender, Argent 
Mortgage, originated 18 percent of home mortgages and 
that the next largest lender, Century Mortgage, originated 
approximately five percent of the mortgages. Although 
both firms, now defunct, were well-known subprime 
lenders, neither was subject to the CRA. The fourth, fifth, 
and sixth largest lenders were likewise not subject to 
the CRA. In fact, the CRA applied to only four of the top 
ten mortgage originators in the Cleveland area in 2005. 
Together, the regulated originators were responsible 
for only 15 percent of originations, amounting to 648 
mortgages. By way of comparison, home foreclosures 
in Cuyahoga County are on a pace to reach 15,000 in 
2008. Rokakis concludes, “Did [the banks] make these 
loans to help their parent institutions’ CRA ratings look 
better?  Possibly. Did these 648 loans play a major role 
in the city’s default and foreclosure crisis?  Hardly.”79
In fact, subprime mortgage lending has become 
a specialized segment of the mortgage business. As 
Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross say, “[T]he 
market share of the top 25 firms making subprime loans 
grew from 39.3 percent in 1995 to over 90 percent in 
2003.”80  As of July 2007, 34 percent of the top 50 resi-
dential mortgage originators, measured in terms of the 
numbers of loans originated, were neither depository 
institutions nor owned by one of the 50 largest bank 
holding companies.81 What is more, subprime lend-
ers are concentrated in California. If the CRA were an 
overriding consideration, one would expect to see most 
large and regional banks competing in the subprime 
lending space to serve low- and moderate-income bor-
rowers, and it would be unlikely that subprime origina-
tion would be dominated by specialists in California. 
That firms not subject to the CRA have come to play 
such a prominent role in the subprime business suggests 
that firms are originating these types of loans to make 
money and not as a response to regulatory or social 
imperatives.
In sum, the evidence shows that the emergence of 
securitization, loan risk pricing, and specialization are 
what caused the subprime mortgage market to grow. The 
CRA may have been one contributor to the growth, but it 
was certainly not a very important one.  
The CRA and Subprime Mortgage Defaults
We now turn to the question of whether regulatory 
pressure to lend to low- and moderate-income borrow-
ers created an environment in which banks and investors 
assumed too much credit risk, or whether market pres-
sures pulled investors and banks into this situation. Mian 
and Sufi find that high demand for mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) led to the surge in subprime lending.82  
Investors underpriced the risk posed by subprime collat-
eralized mortgage obligations (CMOs), while investment 
banks and very large commercial banks created new 
secondary instruments to boost rates of return by greatly 
increasing leverage and liquidity risk. When the housing 
bubble burst, massive write-downs of these highly lever-
aged secondary securities soon followed. 
Between 2004 and 2006, interest rates were reason-
ably low and the yield curve relatively flat; in fact, at the 
end of 2005 and again in January 2006, the yield curve 
was inverted. Yield spreads were so low that investors 
were not being adequately compensated for the risks 
they were assuming. Investors were aggressively seeking 
yield, and saw subprime mortgages as the ticket. Many  
assumed that the default risk of subprime mortgages, 
although higher than that of prime mortgages, would be 
relatively low. Given that the economy was stable, inves-
tors thought they could take advantage of a flat yield 
curve to increase their returns by financing long-term 
securities with cheap, short-term debt.
Investors’ appetite for subprime mortgage securitiza-
tions was huge, and Wall Street responded by providing 
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more of the products, greatly increasing the demand for 
originations of subprime loans. At the retail level, mort-
gage brokers were happy to oblige, as they were paid on 
the volume of loans they originated. 
One consequence of the decoupling of the mortgage 
origination and the mortgage holding process is the 
emergence of an agency problem, which undoubtedly 
played an important role in the events leading up to the 
subprime crisis. When banks make and hold a loan, 
they have every incentive to ensure the screening and 
underwriting process is done properly. After all, they 
stand to lose otherwise. In the originate-to-distribute 
model that became popular prior to the subprime crisis, 
the originator suffers no loss if a borrower defaults, as it 
bears little, if any, of the cost of underwriting mistakes. 
Instead, its income is typically based on the volume of 
loans it sells. Likewise, financial institutions that buy 
these loans have less incentive to scrutinize the loans 
they sell into securitization as carefully as the ones they 
keep. Instead, their income grows when they sell more 
loans into securitization. 
Keys and colleagues confirm these agency problems 
in their analysis of two million home purchase loans 
made between 2001 and 2006. They find that originators 
pushed borderline, but subpar, low-documentation loans 
over the minimum qualifying credit score. As a result, 
the group of loans just above the cut-off score defaulted 
20 percent more often than those just below it. They also 
find that the information available to mortgage-backed 
securities holders tends to understate the true risk of bor-
rower default.83  
Predictably, credit standards declined, especially in 
2006. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke summed 
up the analysis in testimony before Congress: “The 
originate-to-distribute model seems to have contributed 
to the loosening of underwriting standards in 2005 and 
2006. When an originator sells a mortgage and its servic-
ing rights, depending on the terms of the sale, much or 
all of the risks are passed on to the loan purchaser. Thus, 
originators who sell loans may have less incentive to un-
dertake careful underwriting than if they kept the loans. 
Moreover, for some originators, fees tied to loan volume 
made loan sales a higher priority than loan quality. This 
misalignment of incentives, together with strong investor 
demand for securities with high yields, contributed to 
the weakening of underwriting standards.”84
That said, the data show that the defaults of subprime 
mortgages, though quite problematic, are not by them-
selves high enough to cause a freeze in credit markets 
or to push the U.S. economy into recession. As of June 
2008, the stock of subprime mortgages outstanding was 
roughly $2 trillion.85  According to Standard and Poor’s, 
only 20 percent of the worst of the subprime mortgage 
vintages that were originated after 2000 are more than 
90 days delinquent.86  Therefore, seriously delinquent 
subprime mortgages make up about 1.25 percent of all 
home mortgages and, even when including all other 
nonperforming one- to four-family home mortgages, the 
overall 90-day delinquency rate is lower than it was in 
the early 1990s.87  In addition, many delinquent mort-
gages do not go into foreclosure. Demyanyk and Van 
Hemert forecast actual foreclosure rates at less than one-
half of the 60-day delinquency rate.88  
Instead, a new and different kind of securitization, 
rather than traditional subprime mortgage securitiza-
tions, caused the meltdown in the credit markets. In ef-
fect, Wall Street created highly leveraged bets predicated 
on the continued strong performance of traditional sub-
prime mortgage-backed securities. Investment bankers 
morphed subprime mortgages into complicated credit 
derivative products, many of which were based on sub-
prime CMOs and other collateralized debt obligations, 
which they sold to banks and other investors worldwide. 
Unlike stocks, futures, or commodities, these securities 
were not subject to margin requirements, and banks and 
investors paid for these secondary securitizations almost 
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entirely with borrowed short-term money. The resulting 
leverage raised the potential rate of return, but also mag-
nified the negative impact of any diminution in value of 
the underlying mortgages. It was these highly leveraged 
secondary and tertiary financial products that turned a 
problem into a crisis.
As defaults of underlying mortgages began to rise, the 
effect cascaded (and magnified) first onto the subprime 
originators themselves, and then onto the holders of 
these highly leveraged debt instruments. Many inves-
tors, realizing they had underpriced their risks, panicked. 
When investors pulled back, holders of the secondary 
and tertiary subprime securitizations were suddenly un-
able to roll over their debt. Many had no choice but to 
sell whatever assets they had, including these CMOs, at 
deeply discounted prices, thereby further reducing asset 
values. The massive and painful deleveraging we are all 
experiencing today has its immediate roots in this mas-
sive, systemic margin call that started at the end of 2008. 
Given the magnitude and source of the problem, one 
must conclude that CRA loans played at best a bit part in 
this global tragedy.
The declining performance of the most recent vin-
tage of subprime loans is yet another piece of evidence 
that the CRA is not the cause of the subprime problem. 
Standard and Poor’s shows higher delinquency rates, 
measured on an absolute basis, for 2006 vintage loans 
than for earlier vintages.89  Demyanyk and Hemert find 
that, after adjusting for factors such as housing price 
appreciation and borrower credit rating, the average 
loan-to-value ratio increased while loan quality steadily 
declined between 2001 and 2006, yet the price spread 
between prime and subprime mortgages shrank. They 
attribute the declines in underwriting and in pricing to 
a “classic boom-bust scenario, in which unsustainable 
growth leads to the collapse of the market.”90  In other 
words, the pull of investor demand for mortgage-related 
securities drove the market, not a push from banks in the 
supply of mortgages. If banks largely were responding to 
pressure to make CRA loans, we would have witnessed 
the latter phenomenon.
One additional piece of evidence is that regula-
tors have not increased the pressure on banks to make 
more CRA-related loans since 2000. Indeed, regulators 
were beginning to worry about lax lending practices. 
For example, OCC Chief Counsel Julie Williams said in 
a 2005 speech: “Recently introduced flexible financ-
ing options and relaxed terms have enabled many 
Americans to purchase homes they could not otherwise 
afford. But these nontraditional mortgage products 
also have raised concerns—about increased risks for 
borrowers and lenders and how well those risks are 
understood; about the extent to which banks’ lending 
practices are fueling real estate speculation and un-
sustainable housing price appreciation; and about the 
marketing and disclosure practices spawned by the new 
practices and whether consumers fully understand the 
products they are selecting.”91 In September 2006, regu-
lators urged banks to show caution, issuing guidance 
on nontraditional lending products such as “teaser” rate 
mortgages.92  The guidance advised banks to evaluate a 
borrower’s ability to repay the debt at the fully indexed 
rate, and that poorly managed concentrations in these 
products would invite elevated supervisory attention. 
They reiterated many of those points in another state-
ment in March 2007.93
Thus, it is apparent that the increase in subprime 
defaults did not result from the CRA inducing banks 
to reduce underwriting standards or undervalue risk. 
Rather, investors’ desire for higher investment yields and 
Wall Street’s response pulled the non-CRA, unregulated 
mortgage market in that direction.94
89   Standard and Poor’s, “U.S. RMBS Subprime Securitization Volume Declines.”
90   Demyanyk and Van Hemert, “Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis,” abstract.
91	 	Julie	L.	Williams,	“Remarks	by	Julie	L.	Williams	Chief	Counsel	and	First	Senior	Deputy	Comptroller	Office	of	the	Comptroller	of	the	Cur-
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The Future: The Need to Extend the CRA
As we have discussed, the financial services busi-
ness and the manner in which financial products are 
structured, offered, delivered, and held by institutions 
and investors have fundamentally changed in the last 30 
years. This raises the question of whether the CRA must 
also take a different approach to ensuring that low- and 
moderate-income neighborhoods have sufficient access 
to credit and other financial services.
The Changing Structure of Finance
When Congress was debating the CRA, banks were 
the dominant financial services companies, and they 
were certainly the dominant debt holders. However, 
during the past 30 years, the banking and thrift industries 
have been losing ground to other financial companies, 
and today nonbank lenders hold more credit-market 
debt than do banks and thrifts (see Figure 1).  
New technologies, financial innovation, and in-
creased economies of scale have helped to transform 
the financial services sector. Today, nonbanks, including 
hedge funds and broker-dealers, are able to amass sav-
ings and investments efficiently from all over the coun-
try for large borrowers and large securities offerings. In-
dividual investors participate in national capital markets 
via mutual funds, tax-deferred pension funds, hedge 
funds, private equity funds, and others—bypassing tradi-
tional intermediaries. Whereas in 1990, bank and thrift 
deposits exceeded mutual fund shares by $2.75 trillion, 
in 2000 they both held roughly equal amounts.95   
The banking industry responded to these changes in a 
variety of ways, including consolidating into very large, 
multistate companies. Community banks, with clearly de-
fined service areas, have steadily lost market share to the 
big, money-centered banks. Since 1992, banks with $100 
million to $1 billion in assets saw their share of banking 
system assets cut in half, from 19.4 percent to 9.5 percent 
(see Figure 2).96  In 2007, the average institution was 20 
times larger than the average institution in 1977.  
One significant, but frequently ignored, consequence 
of the transformation to national financial markets is 
that local markets and local neighborhoods receive less 
individualized attention. As savings increasingly flow to 
large financial institutions and investment funds, invest-
ment becomes more focused on very large borrowers 
(both domestic and foreign). This is because large banks 
make loans most efficiently when the transactions costs 
per dollar are small. Large banks tend to serve small bor-
rowers with standardized loans and other products, such 
as lines of credit, mutual funds, and credit cards. To make 
money on nonstandard loans—for example, by financing 
a start-up or a small business—requires knowledge of the 
borrower and experience with the local market, as well 
as close monitoring.  Large banks cannot do this cost-ef-
fectively, although a local banker or a specialized lender 
with knowledge of, or close proximity to, local borrow-
ers can. Indeed, community and regional banks more 
actively lend to projects that qualify for CRA credit. In 
2001, banks with less than $1 billion in assets held only 
16.8 percent of bank and thrift assets, but they extended 
about 28.2 percent of all CRA loans and more than 47 
percent of CRA farm loans.97  In fact, small business is 
highly dependent on community and regional banks for 
financing. In 2007, about 25.2 percent of commercial 
loans across the banking industry were in amounts less 
than $1 million. About 63.3 percent of the loans made by 
small banks were less than that amount.98   
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Furthermore, the evolution to global credit markets 
has made the financial services business more competi-
tive, driven by the rise of nonbank entities, and more 
dependent on national and international capital markets. 
One result is that financial products have become more 
complex and sophisticated, and that low- and moderate-
income borrowers must now have greater financial 
sophistication to understand the risks these products 
pose. In this sense, financial products have become less 
sensitive to the needs of low- and moderate-income bor-
rowers. There are no better examples than the pay-option 
adjustable rate mortgages and low-doc home mortgages 
that have been cultivated by Wall Street’s appetite for 
securitized products. 
Low- and moderate-income homebuyers have seen 
their access to credit improve, in part as a result of gov-
ernment priorities.  However, a potential consequence of 
the subprime crisis is a partial retreat of credit from low- 
and moderate-income areas, at least by banks and other 
regulated entities. This creates an opening for un- and 
underregulated outlets, such as check cashing centers, 
payday lenders, unscrupulous home improvement lend-
ers, and sellers of inappropriate insurance and securities 
products, to prey on low- and moderate-income areas. 
Unfortunately, although there are many unscrupulous 
firms willing take the hard-earned savings of low- and 
moderate-income families, firms that offer residents in 
these neighborhoods safe and sound ways to save and 
invest their money are in short supply.
Implications of the Change in Financial Services  
for the CRA
So what do these fundamental changes mean for 
the low- and moderate-income neighborhoods and 
why does it make sense to expand the CRA?  First, the 
obligation to meet the needs of low- and moderate-
income neighborhoods is not being applied to nonbank 
financial services companies, whose share of financial 
assets now exceed those of banks and thrifts, and whose 
holdings continue to grow. Absent a CRA mandate 
that all financial services companies meet the needs of 
low- and moderate-income neighborhoods in the areas 
Figure 1: Market-based Lenders have Surpassed Depository Institutions as Holders of Credit Market Debt
Source: Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds. Credit market debt includes: corporate and foreign bonds, government 
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they serve, and an expansion of the CRA mandate to 
non-credit-related services, these lower-income areas 
will continue to be underserved in financial services and 
fall prey to unscrupulous practices. Low- and moderate-
income areas need access to other financial services and 
products–from insurance, savings, money transmittal, 
and securities services–on fair, nonpredatory terms.99 
This is even more urgent as financial services continue 
their shift from traditional banks to a more complex set 
of institutions and products.
Second, banks and thrifts are no longer the only 
financial service providers that benefit from the federal 
safety net, as they were in 1977. Not only has the Fed-
eral Reserve granted large broker-dealers access to the 
Discount Window, but it has intervened to save a major 
hedge fund (Long Term Capital Management) and a ma-
jor insurance company (AIG) from collapse. The Fed has 
in essence supported almost all large financial services 
companies, regardless of charter, during the present 
financial crisis. 
Third, the holding company structure allows banks to 
reduce their CRA obligations by pushing activities away 
from the bank and onto holding company affiliates; this 
has been going on for the past several years and is com-
mon in the mortgage and consumer lending areas. 
Fourth, in many cases, the area banks serve is no 
longer self-evident or defined by a geographic commu-
nity. Today, virtually all of the top 50 banking companies 
have extensive interstate banking operations. Moreover, 
new kinds of banks have emerged, such as credit-card 
banks and Internet banks, that operate nationwide with 
limited or no local and physical presence. For such 
firms, anchoring CRA obligations to the low- and mod-
erate-income area surrounding a charter or headquarters 
does not reflect the reality of their businesses or their 
impact on low- and moderate-income consumers. 
With respect to the credit needs of these lower-
income neighborhoods, the subprime crisis indicates 
that, when it comes to home mortgages at least, the 
issue may be as much about the need to protect 
borrowers from fraudulent or predatory lending 
practices as it is about the flow of capital. However, 
reigning in the excesses of subprime lending may have a 
disproportionate impact on low- and moderate-income 
Figure 2: Bank Asset Share by Size Class
99	 	Michael	Sherraden	and	Michael	S.	Barr,	“Institutions	and	Inclusion	in	Saving	Policy.”	Working	Paper	BABC	04-15	(Cambridge,	MA:	Har-
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areas. Credit availability in these areas may contract 
substantially if lenders and investors believe wrongly 
that low- and moderate-income borrowers are not 
good credit risks. In that case, vigorous application of 
the CRA would be as necessary as it was in 1977 to 
ensure a continuous flow of investment on fair terms. 
Indeed, inner cities and economically declining regions 
require large capital investment in infrastructure, and the 
demolition or rehabilitation of dilapidated properties, if 
they are to be attractive environments for private capital 
investment, including investments in homes. 
Adapting to New Realities
The obvious response to the changes in the finan-
cial services business would be to apply the CRA to all 
service providers who benefit from the federal safety net 
or who are government chartered and regulated. Besides 
banks and thrifts, this would include broker-dealers, 
insurance companies, and credit unions, at a minimum. 
It ideally would also include all other major financial in-
stitutions important to a stable economy, such as hedge 
funds and private equity funds with more than $250 
million in assets, consistent with the GLBA’s Small Bank 
size cut-off.
Logic and need point to this solution. As noted 
above, nonbank providers of services are expanding in 
the low- and moderate-income marketplace (as well as 
small businesses and farms)–a market the CRA is meant 
to serve. Furthermore, nonbank service providers clearly 
benefit from some form of explicit or implicit government 
support, through a government charter and regulatory au-
thority or through the periodic need for the government 
to step in and resolve problems in times of crisis.
The CRA should be modified to reflect the different 
mix of products and services that many newly covered 
financial services offer, as well as their often nation-
wide reach. In the spirit of the CRA, covered institutions 
would be given maximum flexibility in their CRA-tar-
geted market activities by avoiding the strict quantitative 
goals for CRA investment. For example, these institutions 
would be asked to provide their products to CRA-target-
ed markets, to devise appropriate modifications to their 
products for these markets, or to support the efforts of 
other financial services institutions to provide appropri-
ate financial products and services to these markets. 
When financial firms have widely dispersed products 
and no defined service area, they would be given the 
flexibility to provide these products and services to na-
tional markets or those within their main services areas. 
Banks should also have geographic flexibility in defining 
their service areas. 
To be successful, offering products and services in 
low- and moderate-income areas requires a certain 
degree of expertise, which some large nonbank financial 
institutions either have or can acquire. For example, sev-
eral insurance companies have CRA-like programs that 
add value in low- and moderate-income geographies. 
However, for those institutions that do not have this 
expertise, they should be allowed to partner with com-
munity groups, such as the NeighborWorks networks, to 
serve these areas.
Another approach might be to ask nonbank ser-
vice providers to customize their products to low- and 
moderate-income individuals and geographies, or 
modify their products to support efforts by other finan-
cial services institutions that provide useful financial 
products and services to CRA-targeted markets. For 
instance, broker-dealers might help communities raise 
funds for infrastructure development, hedge funds could 
hold community development-related debt instruments, 
and private equity funds could invest in community 
development projects or instruct firms in which they 
have ownership stakes to fund CRA projects in the 
communities they serve. Alternatively, broker-dealers 
and investment funds could offer pro bono financial, ac-
counting, and tax analysis to community organizations 
and low-income families in targeted neighborhoods. 
This could be modeled after pro bono programs many 
law firms offer.
The goal of the CRA is to encourage doing profitable 
business in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods 
and with low- and moderate-income borrowers. It is 
not about losing money, just as it is not about engaging 
in predatory practices. This means that a revised and 
expanded CRA must encourage the creative use of finan-
cial tools to assist low- and moderate-income individuals 
or communities. For example, educational, community, 
and neighborhood revitalization projects should clearly 
be other ways to fulfill CRA obligations. 
Finally, it will be necessary to examine and rate 
the quality of nonbank financial firms’ CRA programs, 
to clarify regulatory expectations, and to provide an 
independent evaluation of an institution’s efforts to serve 
its community. Realistically, these examinations also 
may be necessary to induce reluctant organizations to 
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communities. Perhaps the best approach would be 
interagency teams to engage in CRA examinations. 
Nonbank financial institutions might also be given 
the option of providing all or part of their CRA assistance 
through the Community Development Financial Institu-
tions (CDFI) Fund or in partnership with Community 
Development Financial Institutions. The federal govern-
ment established the Fund in 1994 to support the estab-
lishment of CDFIs.100  As of August 1, 2008, some 805 
CDFIs have been established in various cities, most of 
which have been successful.101 The CDFI movement has 
been constrained by limitations in the federal budget. 
Additional funds and assistance from nonbank CRA-cov-
ered institutions would add to the success of this effort 
and would support low- and moderate-income neighbor-
hoods,  which is fundamentally the same mission as that 
advanced by the CRA. 
Financial firms should be given the flexibility under a 
modified CRA to provide these products and services to 
those markets that are within their main services areas, 
or nationally where they have widely dispersed products 
and no defined service area; indeed, this geographic 
flexibility ought to be provided to banks as well. Simi-
larly, regulators should implement the revised CRA in a 
manner that preserves the spirit of flexibility. 
To ensure comparable treatment of banks and 
nonbanks, all financial institutions must be subject to 
examination. The results of the examinations should be 
transparent to the public so they can readily discern the 
basis for the ratings. To provide a meaningful incentive 
for institutions to take the ratings seriously, Congress 
might consider capping the percentage of executive 
salary and bonus that is tax deductible if a firm fails to 
maintain at least a Satisfactory CRA rating.
Conclusion
The financial intermediation process, the structure 
of the banking system, and the methods for delivering 
financial services have changed in fundamental ways 
since 1977, and they have changed in ways no one 
could have predicted when the CRA was enacted. The 
facts on the ground in low- and moderate-income neigh-
borhoods have changed as well. Explicit redlining is by 
and large a thing of the past. Innovations in technology 
and financial markets have lowered the cost of mortgag-
es and consumer financing to the point that many more 
creditworthy borrowers are able to access credit.
Yet, the heart of the problem that the CRA was 
intended to solve remains: the need for the financial 
services sector to deliver enough support to low- and 
moderate-income neighborhoods. Neighborhoods re-
quire sound infrastructure, healthy retail businesses, and 
a core of well-maintained homes to retain value and to 
attract investment. There are still information deficiencies 
in these areas, resulting in a more subtle, and perhaps 
unintended but still hurtful, form of redlining, which in 
turn causes some banks to underinvest and contributes 
to racial discrimination in lending. Critics who argue that 
the subprime crisis proves the CRA is a misguided and 
unwarranted government intervention in the financial ser-
vices sector are wrong, not only because the facts show 
that Wall Street excesses, not the CRA, caused the sub-
prime crisis, but also because there are identified market 
failures that require government action to address. 
The CRA will need to be modernized in three areas to 
bring it into the twenty-first century:  
First, because nonbank financial institutions now 
hold more financial assets than banks and thrifts, the 
current CRA is tapping a declining share of the financial 
services sector. We therefore recommend expanding the 
CRA to nonbank financial institutions. 
Second, some nonbank service providers cannot 
deliver financial services directly to low- and moderate-
income residents because they do not have the means 
to make retail loans or provide other relevant retail 
products.  However, they can channel funds through 
banks and thrifts and CDFIs, which do have experts in 
community development and the ability to deliver loans 
at the retail level. Alternatively, nonbanks can play an 
important role in coordinating community development 
initiatives by providing direct and indirect financial sup-
port to community development projects, and offering 
free advisory and support services. 
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Third, providing alternative and innovative ways to 
fulfill CRA obligations, without establishing quotas, 
aligns with the spirit of the CRA and is an approach that 
has been successful to date. It emphasizes flexibility and 
innovation, not credit allocation. 
With these changes, the CRA could become an even 
more powerful engine for revitalizing low- and moder-
ate-income neighborhoods, coming to the fore just when 
the government’s ability to use tax revenues to pay for 
infrastructure improvement and to invest in urban devel-
opment is greatly diminished.
The CRA is not a panacea. Moving it into the twenty-
first century requires the same kind of care and creativity 
that fostered the act in 1977, and provided for its reform 
in the 1990s. However, the CRA has proved it can help 
meet low- and moderate-income individuals and com-
munities’ material needs. Indeed, after the crisis caused 
by the subprime turmoil rolls through these neighbor-
hoods, their problems are likely to be even more acute. 
Accordingly, we urge that the CRA be expanded as we 
have outlined here, and that considerable legislative and 
regulatory effort be turned to this purpose. 
Eugene A. Ludwig is chairman and chief executive officer 
of Promontory Interfinancial Network, and former U.S. 
Comptroller of the Currency.  He also is the founder and 
chief executive officer of Promontory Group, a suite of 
companies offering products and services to assist banks 
and other financial businesses. He is CEO of Promontory 
Financial Group and chairman of Promontory Asset Fi-
nance Company. Prior to founding Promontory, Mr. Lud-
wig served as vice chairman and senior control officer 
of Bankers Trust Corporation/Deutsche Bank.  As head 
of the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC), Mr. Ludwig oversaw the federal agency responsi-
ble for supervising federally chartered commercial banks 
and federal branches and agencies of foreign banks. He 
spearheaded efforts to modernize the banking industry. 
Prior to joining the OCC, Mr. Ludwig was a partner at the 
law firm of Covington & Burling. Mr. Ludwig earned a JD 
from Yale University, a Masters as a Keasbey Fellow from 
Oxford University, and graduated magna cum laude 
from Haverford College.
James Kamihachi provides expertise in areas of risk as-
sessment, risk reporting and compliance. He has nearly 
two decades of experience working on financial institu-
tion regulatory matters. Before joining Promontory, he 
was the founder and managing partner of KCW Partners, 
where he headed projects on regulation of emerging 
technologies and estimating operating risk. Mr. Kami-
hachi was formerly Senior Deputy Comptroller for Eco-
nomic and Policy Analysis at the Office of the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency (OCC). At the OCC, he established 
a corps of risk-modeling experts who advised examiners 
and bankers on their risk models and risk assessment pro-
cesses. Also, he was a U.S. delegate to the G-10 Work-
ing Group on Electronic Money, and a member of the 
Basel Capital Committee’s Research Task Force. While a 
member of the Task Force, he evaluated the impact of the 
proposed Basel II capital standards. Earlier, Mr. Kamihachi 
served as chief of the Regulatory Analysis Branch at the 
Office of Management and Budget, and deputy director 
of the Economic Analysis Division at the Environmental 
Protection Agency. Mr. Kamihachi has an MBA from Har-
vard Business School and a BA from Williams College.
Laura Toh’s prior work experience includes researching 
funds and equities in the global technology sector and 
analyzing company reports and accounts for Singapore 
Technologies Asset Management, as well as writing for a 
travel magazine in New York. Ms. Toh graduated magna 
cum laude from Georgetown University with a degree 
in Economics and Psychology, as well as a minor in 
French language studies. Along with her studies, Ms. 
Toh wrote for two student papers, worked at the col-
lege radio, tutored for underprivileged Washington, DC 
children, and volunteered as a teacher and mentor for 
disabled children.  